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By Prof. Paul B. McGuinness, Department of Finance, CUHK Business School 
The gender composition of corporate boards is currently a hotly-debated topic, with regulators, 
lobby groups and social commentators all active in the push for greater female board 
representation. The literature suggests that female empowerment offers potential corporate 
advantage, due to the enhanced monitoring, mentoring and other synergies wrought by gender-
diversity. My recent article in the Journal of Business Ethics, entitled “IPO Firm Performance and 
Its Link with Board Officer Gender, Family-Ties and Other Demographics” [1], delves into and 
sheds new light on this central issue. The study considers how female board presence and family 
linkage shape long-run stock and financial returns in IPO firms listing on Hong Kong Exchanges 
and Clearing Limited’s (HKEX) Main Board. The purpose of the present discussion is threefold. 
First, to profile my study’s principal findings. Second, to extend its ambit by assessing policy 
implications. Third, to consider recent regulatory developments. 
As well as examining the under-researched area of IPOs and board demographics, my study 
distinguishes between the influence of family and state on the board gender-firm performance 
relation. Issuers subdivide neatly into three groups: Non-state firms with family-connected 
directors; non-state issuers devoid of such connection; and state-sponsored entities. I define a 
family-connected board where family-association links two or more directors. In multivariate 
terms, my study reveals more resilient performance in firms that invite greater gender-
mix and exclude family-ties between directors. This uplift in returns (or “gender premium”) 
disappears when family-association links two or more directors. The absence of family-ties 
between directors and the presence of women thus combine as a strong positive in supporting 
firm performance. The dominance of family firms in Asia and the global pressure for gender-
inclusivity give powerful resonance and prescriptive value to this finding. 
Measurement of board members’ common family-affiliations 
Listing provisions on HKEX require that prospectus documents report all material family-ties 
between directors as well as officers’ key demographics. Such disclosure enables deeper 
scrutiny of family influence, inviting assessment beyond simple ownership characteristics. For 
example, some closely-held firms may only have one family-based board member, with no family 
connection to other directors. Despite strong family ownership, such a firm has a non-family-
connected board in terms of my definition. Many other family-owned firms house boards with two 
or more officials linked by family association. At the margin, there are IPO entities in my study 
with as many as five or six family-connected directors. 
Do family-connections between directors offset or simply re-direct female board 
influence? 
Women likely face constraints where family-connection links two or more board members. 
Findings also support a selection effect, in which women unsponsored by family-affiliation, 
ascend to boards on account of their strong bona fides and industry expertise. These findings are 
instructive given the paucity of information on how family-ties, officer gender and IPO 
performance interact [2]. 
My study’s multivariate analysis also demonstrates that firms containing boards with spousal-
connection register relatively weak post-IPO performance. Such an outcome is consistent with a 
board spousal-tie limiting information channels. Indeed, a spousal-team may act in inhibiting or 
blocking the synergies and resources on offer from other board officers. 
Why do women, especially in boards free of intra-board family-connection, offer value? 
The hypotheses section of my paper offers detailed critique of how gender diversity promotes 
competitive advantage. Team theory, for instance, stresses cognitive benefits in decision-making 
and strategy areas [3]. Other studies show women to be better monitors, mentors and drivers of 
positive change. While offering consistency with such arguments, my results reveal that the 
presence, number and type of intra-board family-ties matter in mediating a possible “gender 
premium” effect. 
Why focus on IPO firms in addressing the “gender premium” effect? 
First, the complete absence of information on pre-IPO equity value means that governance and 
board demographics potentially take-on even more importance in guiding investment decisions. 
Second, unlike seasoned firms, IPO entities are likely to be free of a confounding “Glass Cliff” 
effect [4]. This effect asserts that female leaders receive a higher probability than men of being 
assigned leadership roles in underperforming entities. Women, if appointed to top-level positions, 
may thus face more exacting and taxing business conditions than men. As IPO firms typically list 
on rising earnings, a “Glass Cliff” effect seems less plausible and relevant in the case of newly-
listed firms. 
Self-selection issues could arise in other ways. My study thus compares financial 
performance before and after IPO. For entities with female board presence that exclude board 
family-ties, average pre-IPO profit growth appears substantially below rates for many other 
issuers. However, such entities’ post-IPO profit growth is stronger than many others. This area 
reaffirms the “gender premium” effect. 
The importance of state support and ownership 
My paper also reports that state-controlled H-share and Red-Chip firm boards are largely free of 
family-connected directors. These state-sponsored entities account for around 20% of the study 
sample. Political-ties are clearly much more important in such cases. I find more resilient post-
IPO returns in many H- and Red-Chip firms. Why does state support help stabilize and support 
post-listing returns? My study asserts that many, if not most, state-backed entities listing on 
HKEX are of high strategic-political importance. Such firms often enjoy oligopolistic positions in 
their respective business markets. Many also benefit from asset enhancement and capital 
injection in the run-up to offshore listing, not to mention preferential terms and access to bank 
funding and external capital post-IPO. Performance effects for state-sponsored IPOs on HKEX 
are thus likely to be quite different to those for mainland A-share IPOs [5], where a wider range of 
state-issuer types is evident. Additionally, the offshore domicile of Red Chip companies means 
such companies are unable to countenance A-share listing. By way of contrast, a sub-set of H-
issuers also possess a mainland A-share cross-listing. 
Family influence and private owners’ support of female board presence 
In relation to my study, women account for only 5.1% of board members in state-backed HKEX-
listed IPO firms. Female representation is much higher in non-state firms, accounting for around 
11.2% of all board positions. This palpable difference highlights the private sector’s primacy over 
the state in the promotion of gender-diverse boards in China [6]. The study also reveals that 
family-connections between directors matter. For non-state firms with two or more board family-
connected officers, women account for 13.4% of all directors. In contrast, non-state firms 
without intra-board family-ties accommodate a smaller proportion of women (8.9% of all board 
directors on average). 
Where do we go from here? 
A number of initiatives now figure to encourage female board presence in publicly-listed firms in 
Hong Kong [7]. However, very recent accounts [8], for the broader range of publicly-listed entities 
(i.e., non-IPO firms), indicate only limited improvement in gender board mix in recent years. Old 
attitudes and resistance to change act as important roadblocks. At a basic and instructive level, 
further investor education and guidance in highlighting the benefits of gender mix would help in 
surmounting some of these obstacles. 
Hong Kong lags well behind a number of Scandinavian and Western European countries in 
regard to female board representation rates [9]. However, it does considerably better when 
drawing comparison with other Asian markets [8]. Nonetheless, around 45% of firms in my Hong 
Kong IPO study adopt all-male boards. Other jurisdictions, notably India, have tried to remedy 
such occurrence by demanding all listed companies appoint at least one female board member. 
Reports suggest that many firms in India have responded by promoting the female relative of an 
incumbent officer to the board [10]. As my study suggests, such practice is unlikely to boost 
performance [11]. Ideally, women elevated to boards through quota should be unencumbered by 
obvious family connection to other directors, especially where such connection limits a new 
entrant's resources and inputs. 
Whether Hong Kong will embrace quota provisions in the coming years remains to be seen, and 
if pursued would constitute a radically new path for the economy in its pursuit of greater diversity. 
There is also debate as to whether formal gender quotas improve firm performance. Ahern and 
Dittmar (2012), for instance, identify weakening Tobin’s Q levels for Norwegian firms in the years 
immediately following the country’s imposition of a 40% female gender board quota [12]. Among 
other things, they ascribe such a result to the policy’s effect in reducing board experience levels. 
As an important qualification, the market impact of any quota policy likely reflects its specific 
remit and design, as well as the institutional, regulatory and social structure of the locale in 
question. Terjesen, Aguilera and Lorenz (2015: 235) identify ten jurisdictions where gender board 
quotas apply [9]. Judgement as to the efficacy of quotas requires further research. Their long-run 
effects on firm performance may well depend on the extent to which quota arrangements shape 
overall board expertise levels.  
Finally, and to conclude, my study supports a growing view that gender bias imposes sizeable 
economic cost on society and corporate stakeholders more specifically. My paper quantifies such 
cost for IPO firms (in relation to long-run multivariate return effects). It also offers prescription for 
family-owned firms in regard to the composition of executive director teams. 
  
Notes: 
[1] McGuinness, Paul B. (2016). “IPO Firm Performance and Its Link with Board Officer Gender, 
Family-Ties and Other Demographics”. Journal of Business Ethics. 
[2] My paper reports that few studies investigate the interaction between board gender and family 
influence. However, family influence may boost female board participation, as in Spain [see 
Campbell and Minguez-Vera (2008: Journal of Business Ethics, 3, 435-451) and in Italy [Bianco, 
Ciavarella & Signoretti (2015: Corporate Governance: An International Review, 23/2, 129-144)]. 
Sarkar and Selarka (2015: SSRN 2730551) report on family and board gender effects in relation 
to the performance of Indian manufacturing firms. 
[3] See, in particular, Woolley, Chabris, Pentland, Hashmi & Malone (2010: Science, 330, 686–
688). 
[4] This is a term brought into vogue and investigated in Ryan and Haslam (2005: British Journal 
of Management, 16, 81–90; & 2007: Academy of Management Review, 32, 549-572). 
[5] Fan, Wong & Zhang (2007: Journal of Financial Economics, 84, 330-357) assess “onshore” 
Chinese A-share IPO firms. They demonstrate that the “political-connections” of board officers 
shape performance. 
[6] Lam, McGuinness & Vieito (2013: Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 21, 1136-1159) report on 
CEO gender effects in mainland Chinese A-listed entities. The paper was featured in Chinese 
Business Knowledge@CUHK earlier. 
[7] HKEX strongly encourages diversity at board-level. A specific directive on this matter came 
into effect in 2013 (see Update No. 108, “Amendments to Main Board Listing Rules”, HKEX, 
September 2013). 
[8] See Page 8 of “The CS Gender 3000: The Reward for Change”, Credit Suisse Research 
Institute, September 2016. 
[9] See Page 234 of Terjesen, Aguilera & Lorenz (2015: Journal of Business Ethics, 128, 233-
251) for detailed country comparison. 
[10] See Bhalla, N., “Indian firms mock gender diversity …” (Reuters, 2 April 2015). 
[11] Sarkar and Selarka (2015: op. cit.) reveal that Indian firms’ affiliated-directors do not add 
corporate value. 
[12] See Ahern and Dittmar (2012: The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 127, 137-197). 
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